Contracting out, an empirical study on motives by Wassenaar, M.C. et al.
TI 2010-121/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Contracting out, an Empirical Study 
on Motives  
 Mattheus Wassenaar* 
Tom Groot** 
Raymond Gradus*** 
 
* Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration; 
**) VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; 
***) VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Tinbergen Institute. 
 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute 
 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for economic 
research of the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.:  +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA  Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 1
Contracting out, an empirical study on motives1 
Mattheus Wassenaar*), Tom Groot**), Raymond Gradus***) 
 
Keywords: Contracting out, municipalities, institutional theory, motives 
 
Abstract 
Municipalities may have various motives for decisions on the mode of their task 
execution. Empirical studies – based on both public choice and transaction costs theory - 
have not yet provided a fully comprehensive explanation for municipal contracting out 
decisions. Therefore, we held interviews with Dutch municipal managers about the 
motives for the actual mode of service provision. This study provided the opportunity to 
investigate the relevance of motives on contracting out, to explore of additional motives 
and to test these statistically. As we find, municipalities do not regularly evaluate the 
service provision of their activities. Only in case of structural underperformance, 
municipalities consider a change of service provider, and then, the efficiency motive is 
most relevant. However, we conclude that institutional motives – as the stability of 
service provision - are relevant for contracting out decisions as well. 
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1. Introduction 
A broad range of studies show the benefits of contracting out as competition for contracts 
can increase efficiency of public activities such as refuse collection and cleaning services 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Tang, 1997). Other benefits, as the quality of private 
service provision, may be relevant as well. However, the European VAT (Value Added 
Tax) system favours public provision over contracting out to the private sector. 
Contracting out leads – despite the potential cost-efficiency - to higher gross costs for 
governments, as the net costs of the service are raised by VAT. Therefore, public 
authorities cannot make an optimal decision to achieve efficiency gains or for non-
budgetary considerations. As in northern European countries, the Dutch government in 
2003 introduced a refund scheme to address this distortion (Wassenaar and Gradus, 
2004). However, as Wassenaar et al. (2010) show, this did not lead to a significant 
change in contracting out.  
 This paper explores the motives of Dutch municipalities in favour or against 
contracting out their activities to public or private external service providers and 
contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we provide an analysis of motives for 
contracting out decisions for municipalities, by interviewing the responsible managers. 
The second innovative aspect is that we include an explorative search for the relevance of 
institutional and pragmatic motives in contracting out decisions, in addition to the more 
common public choice and transaction costs approaches. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical motives for public 
authorities for contracting out their activities. Section 3 describes the research questions 
of this study and section 4 presents the survey methodology we use. Section 5 discusses 
the results of the interviews, while section 6 discusses these results with respect to the 
empirical literature ending with concluding remarks. 
 
2. Motives for contracting out 
Municipalities may have various reasons to contract out their service delivery to the 
private sector. Private contractors possess advantages over public organisations as they 
have a stronger focus on results due to the competition among suppliers, the necessity to 
earn at least an average return on investment, a more flexible labour force, fewer 
procedural constraints and more powerful structure of incentives for managers (Hart et 
al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998). Besides, private companies can profit from economies of scale 
as they can distribute their fixed costs over more than one municipality. Some of these 
advantages are valid for public organisations such as inter-municipal corporations as well, 
as they achieve similar results by creating a market for service provision beyond a single 
jurisdiction (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2003).  
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Many studies find support for the efficiency claims for contracting out public 
activities such as refuse collection, fire protection and cleaning services. Overview 
studies (e.g. Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Tang, 1997) indicated cost savings of about 
twenty percent, without sacrificing the quality of services provided. However, other 
reviews of empirical literature suggested that the support for the efficiency claim is at 
best mixed (Boyne, 1998a; Hodge, 2000). Recently, Bel and Warner (2008) concluded 
that no direct and systematic relationship can be established between savings or 
productivity gains and private production.  
A second prominent benefit of outsourcing is the higher quality of private 
production (Brudney et al., 2004). However, the effect of contracting out on service 
quality remains largely unknown, as only a few empirical studies have been conducted on 
this issue. In a meta-analysis (Hodge, 2000), the effect of contracting out on service 
quality was statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Differences in contracting out 
Despite the potential benefits of contracting out, local governments differ in the extent to 
which they outsource their activities. A number of theories are used to explain the 
municipal considerations for contracting out. Public choice theory focuses on the public 
organisation and the behaviour of managers, and is useful to investigate the reasons for 
municipalities to transfer a part of their production to the private sector. Transaction costs 
theory is especially useful for understanding the reasons why certain activities are 
contracted out, while other services are provided by the municipalities themselves. 
However, despite a broad range of empirical studies based on both theories, a 
comprehensive explanation for the contracting out behaviour of municipalities is still 
lacking (Bel and Fageda, 2007). Neo-institutional literature postulates theories on the 
dynamics of organisations. However, this literature has not been tested empirically on the 
aspect of contracting out.  
Most studies on contracting out behaviour of public organisations are based on 
public choice theory (Bel and Fageda, 2007). This theory focuses on the political 
motivations behind managerial decisions. Public managers are credited as self-interested 
agents who try to maximise their personal utility and interest through longer terms or 
larger budgets (Niskanen, 1971). Therefore, they will monopolise public service delivery 
leading to a sub-optimal level of production and inefficiency. The remedy for this 
behaviour is competition in markets for public services. Consequently, contracting out 
should lead to lower costs and higher technical efficiency.  
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Public choice theory leads to three hypotheses about the municipal decision-making 
on the contracting out of public services (Lopez-de-Silanes, et al., 1997; Bel et al., 
2007).2 
1. Efficiency. Cost reduction may be an important objective of contracting out, to be 
realised through competition and the exploitation of scale economies. Smaller 
municipalities may profit from contracting out via scale advantages by the 
aggregation of the demands of more than one municipality by a private company. 
Besides, the potential for cost reduction may be higher in larger and urban areas 
where more private providers are available as this increases the potential for 
competition (Warner and Hefetz, 2002; Hebdon and Jalette, 2008).  
2. Political patronage. Contracting out decisions may be dependent of pressure 
groups having a particular interest in the rents from a specific type of service 
delivery. Hence, a high level of unionisation has been negatively linked to 
privatisation. On the other hand, strong industrial interests should lead to 
privatisation.  
3. Ideology. As voters have preferences on the role of government, ideology may 
influence privatisation discussions. Left-wing governments will be more reluctant 
to privatise local services, in contrast with right-wing governments, as they are 
more pro-private business values, whereas left-wing parties are conventionally 
associated with public values. 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997), based on data for 12 sectors for nearly all US-
countries, showed the importance of political factors for the decision whether public 
services are contracted out. It seems that US-politicians derive significant benefits from 
in-house provision of public services – such as support from public employee unions and 
possibilities to influence unemployment through public payrolls – they would lose in case 
of privatisation.  
In a study on municipal refuse collection in the Netherlands, using panel data for 
all Dutch municipalities, Dijkgraaf et al. (2003) found evidence that relatively high grants 
from the central government (the efficiency motive, as a higher transfers might diminish 
the emphasis on cost savings) or a high level of unemployment (the political patronage 
motive) raises the probability of contracting out. Moreover, smaller municipalities are 
more likely to choose a private waste collector due to scale economies. Ideological 
factors seem to play a minor role. Bel and Miralles (2003) concluded in a study based on 
the privatisation of waste collection, that Spanish municipalities are led by pragmatic 
rather than ideological reasons. Warner and Hebdon (2001) showed that local 
                                                     
2 A fourth hypothesis is that fiscal stress should lead to more privatisation. In the last decades, 
fiscal restrictions were introduced to reduce the ability to raise the local tax revenues in countries 
like the United States. Because in the Netherlands these fiscal constraints are not applied, we will 
not investigate this fourth hypothesis in this study. 
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governments are more concerned with practical issues of service quality, and less with 
ideology, politics and unionisation. Pragmatism wins out over politics as local 
governments give a keen eye to market structure, service quality and efficiency concerns.  
In a meta-study, Bel and Fageda (2007) analysed 28 multivariate studies from six 
countries on local privatisation. They found that fiscal stress and interest group pressures 
influenced the privatisation of local services in early US-studies that considered a broader 
range of services. Interest groups have their influence, particularly for smaller 
municipalities in small towns. Cost considerations are especially relevant when the 
exploitation of scale economies is taken together with privatisation choices. However, the 
ideological attitudes of policy makers do not seem to influence the service delivery choice 
of local governments in a systematic way. Finally, the authors concluded that local 
government decisions appear to be more pragmatic than ideological. 
However, Bel and Fageda (2007) concluded that the explanatory power of these 
empirical studies is, in general, low. One explanation is that most studies do not analyse 
the privatisation decision in year t-x (the move from public to private) but use the actual 
production form in year t as a dependent variable. Therefore, these studies are based on a 
mis-specified model, as the dependent variable does not measure a dynamic choice of 
service production technology but rather the current status of service production (Boyne, 
1998b). Since then, factors testing for the actual mode of service provision might have 
changed completely, while the production mode is still in accordance with the factors that 
were applicable when the decision was made. Another explanation is that local 
governments have limited capability to make discretional decisions about the production 
form after the years privatisation has been implemented, due to for example the duration 
of contracts or difficulties of re-internalising production. Therefore, the decision for 
contracting out is path-dependent. 
Transaction costs 
Despite the potential efficiency of the private sector, the process of contracting out comes 
with transaction costs: ‘the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures’ (Williamson, 1981). From this 
perspective, privatisation can only deliver cost savings whenever they surpass the 
transaction costs (Bel and Fageda, 2007).  
Williamson (1981) focused on two broad service-specific characteristics being 
relevant for the transaction costs, asset specificity and service measurability. Asset 
specificity refers to whether specialized investments are required to produce the service. 
These assets apply to the production of one service but are very difficult or at high costs 
to adapt for the production of other services and offer an advantage to the first contract 
winner, thus creating a barrier to entry. Service measurability refers to the difficulties for 
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the contracting organization to measure the outcomes of the service or to monitor the 
activities required to deliver the service. Contracting out is likely to be more successful if 
the magnitude and the specificity of the assets required to provide the service are smaller, 
the quality characteristics that are non-contractible are less important and competitive 
supply in the market, both actual and potential, is large (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). 
In a US-study on 64 types of municipal activities, Brown and Potoski (2005) 
supposed a relationship between the contracting out decisions of municipalities and the 
potential transaction costs due to the asset specificity and the measurability of services. 
However, a statistical analysis on this hypothesis is lacking in this study. Brown et al. 
(2008) showed that both service measurability and asset specificity influence the service 
delivery choices. 
Neo-institutional literature 
Neo-institutional literature describes that economically rational considerations do not 
fully explain the behaviour of public organizations. Institutional factors – as rules, values, 
habits, power, and internal and external pressure – all influence change processes in 
organizations (Lounsbury, 2008; Modell, 2009; Scott, 2008; Ter Bogt, 2008). In this 
literature, it is assumed that a primary determinant of organizational structure is the 
pressure exerted by external and internal constituencies on the organization, to conform 
with a set of expectations to gain legitimacy and so secure access to vital resources and 
long-term survival. Therefore, the primary objective of organizational change is not a 
better performance but greater legitimacy. Organizations adapt in order to conform to the 
expectations of the key stakeholders (Brigall and Modell, 2000; Ashworth et al., 2007).  
Oliver (1992) identified three sources of pressure on institutional norms or 
practices leading to institutional change: functional, political and social. Functional 
pressures for de-institutionalisation are those that arise from perceived problems in 
performance levels or the perceived utility associated with organizational practices. 
Political pressures arise when the utility or legitimacy of current practices is seriously 
called into action. Social pressures arise from the environment of the organisation, as 
disruptions to the organisations historical continuity or changes in law or societal 
expectations (Dacin et al., 2002). Besides, change processes need drivers to occur. Innes 
and Mitchell (1990) distinguished three types: facilitators, motivators and catalysts. 
Facilitators comprise a set of factors conducive to change: they are necessary but in 
themselves not sufficient for change to occur. Motivators are factors that influence 
change processes in general manner: they provide decision makers the reasons and 
grounds to initiate and permit change. Catalysts contain factors directly related to the 
timing of change: they are occurrences that lead directly to the initiation of change and 
provide the opportunity for change to take place (Groot and Lukka, 2000).  
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 Brown and Potoski (2003) showed that institutional forces exert significant 
influences on governments’ service production choices. For example, the council-
manager status influences the service production decisions of governments. In a study on 
contracting out using data for 500 cities in Southern California, Joassart-Marcelli and 
Musso (2005) showed that service provision and production arrangements tend to be 
made at the time of city formation, and that political and institutional rigidity limit the 
extent to which arrangements subsequently are changed. This reflects the possibility of 
path-dependency. Brown et al. (2008) showed that service delivery choices exhibit strong 
inertia, and when change occurs the previous service delivery mode influences the 
likelihood of changing to other service-delivery modes in important ways. Wassenaar et 
al. (2010) described institutional motives that might play a role in considering contracting 
out as the stability of municipal service provision and the legal status of municipal 
employees. Despite the potential elucidation of this literature on the concept of 
contracting out, neo-institutional literature has not been tested extensively on this subject 
yet.  
 
3. Research questions 
Despite the vast amount of studies, a comprehensive explanation for municipal decisions 
between self-supply and contracting out is still not available. Besides, these studies lack 
in general an explanation for the cause of considerations about contracting out. Most 
studies are based on multivariate regression analyses, used to investigate the relationship 
between the actual level of contracting out to a range of municipal characteristics. These 
characteristics – as the number of inhabitants or the level of the local tax rate - are related 
to the factors that might influence the decision-making on contracting out (as for both 
examples the scale and the budgetary situation of the municipality). They give an indirect 
analysis of the motives in favour of or against contracting out, as they attempt to discover 
the revealed preferences behind this decision.  
 This study adds to this literature by directly interviewing the responsible 
municipal managers about the motives relevant to decision-making on contracting out. 
With these interviews, we explore: (1) the cause of contracting out discussions and 
decisions, (2) the most relevant motives for municipalities in decisions for contracting or 
not, and (3) motives for the choice of the mode of the provision of the service (i.e. 
whether it is publicly – in-house or out-house - or privately produced). This case study 
approach provides the opportunity to both investigate the standard theoretical concepts 
from public choice and transaction cost theory, as to explore the relevance of institutional 
and pragmatic motives. 
However, we notice that psychological research has shown that a drawback of this 
interview approach is the fact that it is for people, in general, difficult to describe the 
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motives for their decisions (Johansson, 2005). Therefore, this study is useful to 
understand contracting out behaviour, although general applicable conclusions are 
difficult to draw. Otherwise, for the decisions we investigate in this study, not personal 
but organisational motives are relevant, and we expect that these are more objectively 
defined. 
 
4. Method 
For this study, we held 17 semi-structured interviews with the municipal executives. This 
principal municipal civil servant is the main advisor of the municipal Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen, and is responsible for the management of the municipal organisation. 
Therefore, he (or she) plays a major role in discussions on contracting out or not. We 
made an interview protocol we tested with one municipal employee and two researchers 
with a broad experience in this kind of interviews. The municipalities were chosen using 
a stratified sample design. As previous research shows, the municipal size, the political 
constellation and the financial position of the municipality might be relevant aspects in 
understanding differences between municipalities (Dijkgraaf et al., 2003; Bel and Fageda, 
2007). We used four categories of size (see table 2). For the political constellation of the 
municipality, we counted the relative number of aldermen with a membership of one of 
the left-wing parties (socialist party, green left and the labour party) in April 2009 (three 
years after the last municipal elections). In case this indicator comes at 50 percent, the 
relative number of left-wing members of the municipal council is decisive for the 
nomination left-wing vs. right-wing. As we suppose the level of local taxes to be 
negatively related to the financial prosperity, we use the net local tax burden for a four-
person household (2 adults, 2 children) in 2008, consisting of the real estate tax, the 
sewerage charge and the refuse collection charge (Allers et al., 2008), as the indicator. 
For each combination of these three municipal characteristics, we held at least one 
interview. As municipal mergers might be a relevant aspect for this issue, we held four of 
the interviews in municipalities that merged in recent years or will merge in the near 
future.3 We sent an e-mail or letter to the municipal executive to ask for participation in 
this study including an explanation of the research theme and the headlines of the 
interview. Most of the municipalities were directly willing to participate. In five 
municipalities, the executive delegated this interview to a deputy or another manager, in 
most cases due to their more long-term affiliation with the municipality. 
                                                     
3 The interviews were held in Amersfoort, Breukelen, Groningen, Heerenveen, Hoogezand-
Sappemeer, IJsselstein, Krimpen aan den IJssel, Leeuwarden, Lelystad, Midden-Delfland, 
Nunspeet, Oostzaan, Purmerend, Rijnwoude, Westland, Zijpe, and Zwolle. Appendix A describes 
the main characteristics of these municipalities. 
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The interviews were held in the months April until June 2009 and lasted between 
an hour and an hour and a half.4 A report was written directly afterwards, based on the 
notes made during the interview. This report was sent directly to the interviewees for 
comment and were approved all. Based on the interview reports, the answers were 
categorized. We coded the texts of the reports on all relevant aspects (cause, motives, and 
mode of service provision, all with the explanation). These data were used for analysing 
information presented in the interviews. Besides, we made a database of the quantitative 
answers. 
 To discuss the municipal motives for contracting out, the interviews consisted of 
four sections: 
- A: An explorative open question on the main motives in considerations made on 
contracting out and the main catalysts for these discussions.  
- B: Closed questions about the relevance on the motives as described in table 1. This 
table shows for each motive an explanation and the relevant theoretical basis. For 
each motive, we asked the extent of relevance (on a five point Lickert-scale), whether 
it was a motive in favour or against contracting out, and an explanation for the 
answers. 
- C: An explorative discussion on three recent or actual cases of considering or 
deciding about contracting out. We discussed the main motives for the actual or 
recent decision, the causes for the discussion and the mode of the service provision as 
decided with its arguments. 
- D: Closed questions on, for ten specified activities, the causes and motives for the 
current mode of service provision: (1) cleaning services, (2) canteen services, (3) 
security, (4) payroll administration, (5) IT-services, (6) social services, (7) refuse 
collection, (8) small infrastructure works, (9) valuation of real estate, and (10) park 
management.  
The questions in the sections A, B and C are used to explore the relevance of the 
several motives on contracting out as described in the literature and to find additional 
motives on this issue. The questions in sections B and D are more structured and these 
results are presented in tables. Besides, these results, in particular the relevance of the 
additional motives as provided in the interviews, are tested statistically to assess their 
relative importance. Appendix B contains the Interviewprotocol as used for this study. 
                                                     
4 Two interviews with merging municipalities were held in February 2010. 
 10
Table 1 Motives for contracting out or not 
Motive Explanation Literature 
Public choice motives 
Efficiency The lower costs of external service provision Bel et al., 2007; Bel and 
Fageda, 2007 
Quality of external 
service provision 
The higher quality of external service provision Brudney et al., 2004; Hodge, 
2000; Warner and Hebdon, 
2001 
Political patronage The influence of local interested parties, as lobby 
groups, labour organisations or local businesses 
Bel et al., 2007; Bel and 
Fageda, 2007 
Public private ideology Opinion of the role of the government in 
comparison with the market 
Bel et al., 2007; Bel and 
Fageda, 2007 
Transaction costs motives 
Transaction costs Transaction costs that come with the process of 
contracting, as costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring. 
Brown and Potoski, 2005 
Costs of assets The relatively high costs of investments that have to 
be made for service provision. 
Brown and Potoski, 2005 
Institutional motives 
Independence of external 
providers 
The independence of external providers from the 
municipal organisation 
-1 
Local employment Concern for employment in the municipality itself, 
especially for organisations for sheltered 
employment 
Wassenaar et al.., 2010 
Core tasks Core tasks as defined by the municipality itself 
(tasks that cannot be contracted out, due to the 
municipal responsibility). 
-1 
Stability of service 
provision 
The stability of service provision Wassenaar et al.., 2010 
Availability of 
alternatives 
The availability of more than one external service 
provider. 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2007 
Introduction of the VAT-
compensation fund 
The opportunities as arisen with the introduction 
with the VAT-compensation fund in 2003. 
Wassenaar et al.., 2010 
Pragmatic motives 
Availability of expertise 
in the own organisation 
The availability of expertise and quality in the own 
organisation as needed for an adequate service 
level. 
Wassenaar et al., 2010 
Flexibility The flexible design of the municipal organisation, 
because of the lack of a constant level of work. 
Bel and Fageda, 2010 
Available quantity of 
personnel 
The availability of enough personnel for an 
adequate service level. 
Wassenaar et al., 2010 
1. As far as we know, these motives are not described in previous studies, but are hypothesized in this 
explorative research study 
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The motives as presented in table 1 are the principle hypotheses of public choice and 
transaction costs theory. As institutional literature has not been tested extensively on the 
issue of contracting out, we suppose some motives, partly based on Wassenaar et al. 
(2010) to play a role. Common aspect of these institutional motives is that they are related 
to the potential pressure exerted by both external (citizens) and internal (employees) 
constituencies on the organization to conform to a set of expectations. We suppose the 
following institutional motives to be relevant from this point of view: ‘independence of 
external providers, ‘local employment’, ‘core tasks’, ‘stability of service provision’, 
‘availability of alternatives’ and ‘the introduction of the VAT-compensation fund’.5 
Finally, as previous research (Bel and Fageda, 2007; Wassenaar et al., 2010) has shown, 
local governments may use pragmatic motives as well. Therefore, we include some more 
organizational and pragmatic motives.6 Some of these motives are not described in 
previous studies, but are hypothesized in this explorative research. We notice that some of 
these motives might be related to each other and describe partially the same aspect. In the 
interviews, we used explanations of each of the motives as described in the protocol in 
appendix B to focus on the actual motive. Based on transaction cost and institutional 
theory, we expect differences in the extent of contracting out between types of activities. 
In section 5.3 we describe the results for activities with high or low levels asset 
specificity and service measurability and internal vs. external activities. 
 
5. Results 
The interviews lead to a broad range of observations on contracting out behaviour of 
municipalities. Section 5.1 describes the catalysts of discussions on contracting out or not 
as provided in sections A, C and D of the interviews. Conclusions on the motives for 
contracting out as discussed in all four sections of the interviews are presented in section 
5.2. Section 5.3 elaborates on the motives for the actual or future mode of service 
provision as based on sections C and D of the interviews. We describe both the relevance 
of the motives as described in the literature so far and the additional motives as provided 
in the interviews. Section 5.4 provides a number of statistical analyses on the data 
provided in section D of the interviews, to structure some mere qualitative results of the 
preceding sections. Besides, these can be used to assess the relative importance of the 
various motives. 
 
                                                     
5 The public choice motive of ‘political patronage’ might be related to institutional theory as well. 
The public choice motive of ‘quality of external service provision’ might be related to the 
institutional motive ‘stability of service provision’ as well. 
6 In the interviews, we discussed the motives ‘optimal scale of the municipal organization’, ‘risk 
avoidance’, and ‘experiences in other municipalities’ as well. However, these motives did in 
general not lead to relevant outcomes. 
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5.1 Catalysts 
Based on sections A, C and D of the interviews, we analysed the catalysts for discussions 
about contracting out. In most municipalities, the mode of service provision is not a 
relevant managerial or political issue. Municipalities do not regularly evaluate their 
organisational performance and the costs and quality of service provision. In fact, if the 
activity has an adequate performance level and complaints from own employees, 
municipal politicians or inhabitants do not occur, a catalyst for a discussion on the 
contracting out of this activity is, in general, lacking. For the ten investigated standard 
activities, most municipalities have not ever discussed contracting out IT-services, the 
payroll administration, canteen services, and social services. Some municipal managers 
explain that the profitable financial position of the municipality or other managerial 
issues as the merger of municipalities impeded these discussions. 
In case of structural dissatisfaction and complaints about the performance, the 
execution of tasks and the mode of the service provision becomes a relevant managerial 
topic. Dependent of the extent of the complaints, this can become a politically relevant 
issue as well, especially for external tasks with a citizen focus such as social services or 
the valuation of real estate. Structural underperformance can appear in different forms, as 
the quality of service provision, the lack of adequate expertise or high levels of absence 
through illness. Some municipalities report the poor quality of service provision of 
external providers as a reason to start the discussion about the self-supply of the services. 
For example, in two municipalities the lack of quality of the private valuation of real 
estate caused extra legal work for the municipality. By contracting in, this task was 
executed more appropriately.  
Some municipalities report – as an example of path-dependency - the building of 
new accommodations (e.g. town hall, swimming pool) as relevant moments for 
considering the mode of the service provision, especially for canteen and cleaning 
services in these buildings. Another relevant moment for starting the discussion about the 
mode of the service provision is a change of the service in itself, due to new legislation or 
the decentralization of tasks. Remarkably, as far as the interviews show, the merger of 
municipalities was in the interviewed municipalities not a catalyst for considering the 
mode of service provision. 
 Only one of the seventeen municipalities reports a regular evaluation of the mode 
of service provision of all activities, by systematically comparing own performance with 
external service providers. A small number of municipalities had discussions years ago 
about their core tasks. In the nineties, this type of organizational evaluation was held in 
many municipalities (Hendriks and Tops, 2003). Main goal was to decide which tasks 
should remain part of municipal services and which tasks should be contracted out or 
privatised. Due to the spirit of these times, most discussion started from the premise that 
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private parties would outperform municipalities in the execution of tasks. However, most 
of the interviewees conclude that these evaluations lacked consequences, except in case 
of major financial problems that forced severe expenditure cuts. Some municipalities 
report ideologically driven discussions about the execution of municipal tasks, mostly 
started by relatively powerful aldermen that were politically responsible for the municipal 
organization. However, these aldermen were both of left-wing (labour party) as right-
wing (liberals, conservatives) parties.  
 As an example of pragmatism, some municipalities describe a change of service 
provision gradually in case one or more employees retire or move to another job. 
Municipal managers explain that – due to the legal status of their employees – contracting 
out can come with high costs of buying off their relatively profitable conditions of 
employment as especially the un- and low-skilled job workers receive, compared to the 
private sector, a relatively high wage-level. In practice, some municipalities make 
arrangements with private contractors to take over of employees, although in many cases 
this is complicated. 
The potential efficiency gains or higher service quality are, on their own, not 
relevant motives to consider the contracting out of municipal services. In most cases, 
other change drivers are necessary to catalyse this consideration. Although the 
introduction of the VAT-compensation fund could have been such an external catalyst, 
none of the interviewed municipal managers states that this caused a change of service 
provision.  
 
5.2 Motives 
Table 2 shows the relevance of all motives, as based on section A and B of the 
interviews. The first column shows the relative number spontaneous answers of the 
motives of section A. The other columns show the results of section B, the assessment of 
the motives on a 5-point Lickert-scale. In bold, the table shows the scores more positive 
than neutral (score lower than 3). In most cases, the answer is positively formulated (the 
motive is in favour of contracting out), although for a small number of motives (public 
private ideology, efficiency) the motive might lead to the conclusion of self-supply. We 
tested with a Mann-Whitney test the differences in scores for the different pairs of 
municipalities (municipalities with less than 40.000 inhabitants vs. municipalities with 
more than 40.000 inhabitants; left-wing vs. right wing municipalities; municipalities with 
high taxes vs. municipalities with low taxes).7 As shown in this table, only for a small 
number of pairs, we find significant differences in scores. Smaller municipalities find the 
motives ‘stability of service provision’, ‘availability of expertise in the own organisation’ 
                                                     
7 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the differences between the four groups of size did not give 
significant differences. 
 14
and ‘available quantity of personnel’ significantly more relevant than larger 
municipalities. For some motives, low and high-tax municipalities have significant 
different scores, however, these scores show that the motives are still not relevant, as they 
are higher than ‘3’.  
Public choice motives 
The efficiency-motive is with a score of 1.8 (table 2) by far the most important motive in 
considerations about contracting out. For many activities, private or public companies can 
provide services at a lower cost than municipalities, due to scale advantages, more 
specialization and more standardization. The efficiency motive is not always based on a 
clear cost comparison, but often on the conviction of lower costs of external parties. 
Some municipalities describe experiences with increasing costs once the task is 
contracted out. For refuse collection such behaviour is well known in literature (e.g. 
Szymanski, 1996). The efficiency motive is most relevant for internal activities (canteen 
services, cleaning services, security, payroll administration, IT-services) or park 
management, refuse collection, small infrastructure works or management of 
accommodations than for mere public tasks with an external scope as social services and 
culture management. As table 2 shows, municipalities with lower tax rates or left-wing 
oriented municipalities seem to find the efficiency motive more relevant than 
municipalities with higher tax rates or right-wing municipalities.  
The quality of external service provision is with a score of 3.0 less relevant, 
although especially the smallest municipalities use this motive. A higher quality level of 
external service providers is attributed to specialisation and economies of scale. For some 
municipalities, the disappointing quality level is the motive for contracting in these 
activities. Especially for the valuation of real estate, municipalities describe the lack of 
quality of private providers and the legal consequences of their underperformance.  
Some municipal managers explain that their own personnel work at a higher quality level 
due to the commitment to their work for the municipality. This quality motive is most 
relevant for internal activities (cleaning services, canteen services, payroll-
administration), although some municipalities used this motive for park management and 
valuation of real estate as well.  
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Table 2 Results of section A and B, values lower than ‘3’ in bold1  
 number of inhabitants   
 
Relevance
in 
general2 
average 20.000-
20.000
- 
40.000
40.000 
- 
100.000 100.000+ 40.000- 40.000+
right
wing
left 
wing
high 
taxes 
low 
taxes 
Public choice theory motives 
Efficiency 31% 1,8 1,6 1,8 1,5 2,3 1,7 1,9 1,9 1,6 2,0 1,5 
Quality of external service provision 8% 3,0 2,1 3,0 4,0 3,1 2,5 3,6 3,0 3,0 3,3 2,7 
Political patronage 2% 4,3 5,0 3,5 4,5 4,1 4,3 4,3 4,2 4,5 4,2 4,4 
Public private Ideology 12% 2,9 4,2 1,5 2,8 2,8 3,0 2,8 3,0 2,8 3,4 2,3 
Transaction costs theory motives 
Transaction costs 1% 4,0 3,8 3,8 4,5 3,9 3,8 4,2 3,6 4,4 3,8 4,1 
Costs of investments 0% 4,1 4,2 3,5 4,0 4,8 3,9 4,4 4,0 4,3 4,6* 3,6* 
Institutional motives 
Independence of external providers 0% 4,1 4,6 3,3 4,5 4,0 4,0 4,3 4,2 4,0 4,6** 3,6**
Local employment 1% 3,9 4,2 3,0 4,5 4,0 3,7 4,3 4,1 3,8 4,3 3,8 
Core tasks 2% 4,1 4,6 3,5 3,1 5,0 4,1 4,1 4,0 4,2 4,1 4,1 
Stability of service provision 9% 3,2 2,2 2,3 4,3 4,3 2,2* 4,3* 2,9 3,5 3,3 3,0 
Availability of alternatives 2% 3,3 2,8 3,0 3,8 3,8 2,9 3,8 3,0 3,6 3,8 2,8 
Introduction of the VAT-compensation fund 0% 4,5 4,4 4,5 4,3 4,8 4,4 4,5 4,6 4,4 4,8* 4,1* 
Pragmatic motives 
Availability of expertise in the own organisation 9% 2,8 2,2 2,3 3,0 3,8 2,2** 3,4** 2,3 3,3 2,7 2,9 
Flexibility 2% 3,3 3,4 2,8 3,0 4,1 3,1 3,6 3,3 3,4 3,4 3,2 
Available quantity of personnel 0% 3,6 3,5 2,3 3,8 4,9 2,9** 4,3** 3,3 3,9 3,7 3,4 
1. The scores had the following meaning: 1: very important, 2: important; 3 neutral, 4 not important, 5: very unimportant 
2. The figure shows the relative value of each of the answers on section A of the interview. As municipalities provided other motives as well, the percentages do not add up to 
100% (especially keeping influence on task execution; 6% and involvement of own personnel, 2%). 
* / ** Differences are significant at p < 0.10 / 0.05 (Mann Whitney U-test). 
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The political patronage motive – by for example labour organisations – is by 
municipal managers with a score of 4.3 not assessed as a relevant motive for contracting 
out or not. Works councils may play a role in the considerations about contracting out, 
and delay at most the process, but do not determine the outcome. Local businesses and 
their organizations are not relevant in the discussion about contracting out. However, we 
cannot exclude that these outcomes are social preferable answers on the patronage issue. 
The public private ideology-motive is relevant, especially for municipalities with 
lower tax rates. The score between left and right-wing municipalities are almost alike, 
although the interviews show that a great number of more right-wing municipalities have 
a strong opinion of the division of roles between the public and private sector (they 
contract out, unless the market is not able to supply the service at an adequate level). In 
most municipalities, this ideological approach is historically based, by opinions of 
alderman or municipal managers with a strong informal position.  
Transaction costs motives 
The transaction costs of contracting out are not considered a relevant aspect. Some 
municipalities describe the complexity of the European procurement rules as a barrier. 
Some municipalities mention disappointing levels of increasing costs for directing the 
external suppliers once the activity is contracted out. 
The costs of investments for the supply of activities are not a relevant motive for 
considering contracting out. As municipalities are by law obliged to use an accrual 
accounting system, the cost of assets are divided on the years which the investment is 
used. So, the incidental costs of investment might not matter. However, incidentally, the 
aldermen have to ask the city council for permission for contracting a high loan. In these 
cases, the costs of investments might be a relevant motive. High investments may cause a 
discussion on contracting out due to the potentially sub optimal use of the assets. 
Institutional motives 
The independence of external providers is hardly a relevant motive (score of 4.1). For 
some municipalities, this motive is used for contracting out the valuation of real estate to 
limit the discussion with owners of real estate about the estimated value.  
The motive of concern for local employment is in general not relevant. 
Nevertheless, some municipalities try to make use of the sheltered employment due to 
their budgetary and political responsibility for their employees, for example for park 
management. Some municipalities included in their tendering procedures that at least one 
or two local private companies must be offered an opportunity to tender.  
Some of the municipalities started about a decade ago discussion about which 
task they should execute and which tasks should be left to other organisations or the 
 17
market. Most interviewees concluded that these ‘core task discussion’ did not have effect 
on the mode of service provision, although in combination with other relevant factors as a 
deteriorating financial position, these discussions might have had any consequence.  
The stability of service provision is a relevant motive, especially for smaller 
municipalities (table 2). As they explain, their size is too small for a constant level of 
service provision for a number of activities. As one of these smaller municipalities 
described, for example with one garbage truck, garbage will not be collected in case of 
inspection or repair of the truck. Comparable effects occur in case of absence through 
illness or mobility to other work of employees. Especially for canteen services, small 
infrastructure works and cleaning services, this motive is relevant. Some motives – as the 
quality of external service provision, the expertise of the own municipal organisation, the 
available quantity of personnel and the stability of service provision – are mutually 
related, as they all describe an aspect of the problems for smaller municipalities to 
execute their services at an adequate level. As table 3 shows, the percentage of 
contracting out – both public as private – is relatively high for the smaller municipalities. 
Especially for smaller municipalities, the availability of alternatives is a relevant 
motive in considering contracting out (score of 2.9). They explain that only in a non-
monopolistic market for contracting out, for having a real alternative in case of 
disappointing service supply, especially for IT-services, refuse collection and the payroll-
administration.  
The introduction of the VAT-compensation fund did not play an explicit role in 
discussions about contracting out. None of the municipalities started at the time of 
introduction a discussion about the opportunities. However, as the efficiency motive is 
quite relevant, most of the municipalities agree that at least implicitly, the fund might 
have had a relevant impact as cost comparisons between self-service and contracting out 
changed.  
Pragmatic motives 
The availability of expertise in the own organisation is a relevant motive for especially 
smaller municipalities (<40.000). For some expertise and tasks (e.g. urban development 
management, policy preparation and legal services, social services, valuation of real 
estate, building and environmental supervision, complex projects) smaller municipalities 
have not the scale to organize these activities themselves at an adequate level. 
For some activities, municipalities need a flexible work force (e.g. valuation of 
real estate and park management) due to the variable amount of work. As the legal duty to 
valuate all real estate changed in 2007 from once a four-year period to once a year, this 
activity has received a more constant level of work and the flexibility motive has less 
relevance and some municipalities contracted in this task. Interviewees report that the 
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municipal collective labour agreement is relatively expensive with respect to overtime 
work (especially evenings, weekends and holidays). Therefore, for these days hiring of 
external personnel is economically attractive. 
Especially for smaller municipalities, for some activities it is rather difficult to 
have adequate personnel in office. The motive of the available quantity of personnel has 
therefore a relationship with the motives as the availability of expertise, for example 
traffic expertise, valuation of real estate and expertise for urban development.  
 The interviewees provided some motives, in addition to the list in table 1. Some 
explain that by contracting out, it is easier to determine a desired level of service quality 
due to the more formal relationship with external service providers. However, other 
municipalities use internal service level agreements intending the same, referring to the 
importance of informal relationships by managing activities. In some municipalities, 
contracting out is explicitly used to diminish the political discussions about the service 
level of execution of municipal tasks, for example the programme of cultural 
organizations as some more pronounced conservative and right-wing council members 
might have difficulties with certain forms of art as facilitated by public organizations. 
Some municipalities describe the fear, particularly by politicians, of a loss of influence on 
the task execution as relevant motive against contracting out. This motive seems be more 
relevant for tasks with an external scope, than for internal activities. For these internal 
activities and park management, the desire to diminish the extent of managerial executive 
responsibility is a relevant motive. Especially because of the working hours in the 
evenings, the nights, and the weekends (cleaning services, security), direct management is 
relatively complex and expensive. Incidentally, liability on the level of service provision 
and customer orientation are mentioned as a motive in favour or against contracting out. 
However, for none of these additional motives, the different groups of municipalities 
scored values lower than ‘3’ / neutral, on the 5-point Lickert-scale as described at table 2.  
 For a number of situations, the interviewees were not able to label the motive for 
the actual mode of service provision, in most cases due to the fact that the actual state was 
stable since many years. Especially for cleaning services, park management, small 
infrastructure works and security, this answer was given. This might be an indication that 
especially for these types of activities, discussions about contracting out were held many 
years ago. 
 
5.3 Mode of the service provision  
In this study, we distinguish three types for the mode of service provision: self-supply, 
public contracting out and private contracting out. Public contracting out may have 
various forms as the supply by another neighbouring municipality or an intermunicipal 
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corporation under the responsibility and ownership of a group of municipalities Based on 
part C and D of the interviews, we have a number of observations and conclusions. 
For a great number of municipalities, contracting out of some their activities has 
not been discussed, and as a result, the municipality still provides the service itself, in 
particular for IT-services, the payroll-administration, canteen services and the social 
services. The quality of external service provision is a motive for self supply for park 
management and valuation of real estate. Social services are considered to be a core task, 
and to be supplied by the municipality itself. In some cases, self-supply is argued by 
pointing at the need for getting to grips on the execution of activities. Only in a small 
number of cases, the comparison between self-supply and contracting out leads to the 
conclusion that self supply is preferable (especially refuse collection, IT-services, 
assessment of real estate and park management). For the valuation of real estate, some 
municipalities decided for contracting in, due to the poor service quality of external 
providers. 
The most important motive for contracting out to public organisations is that the 
municipality is convinced that self-supply is no longer optimal, but that due to the nature 
of the task and the legal municipal responsibility, contracting out to another public 
organisation as, for example, another municipality is the only alternative (e.g. social 
services, environmental inspection and public education). Another important motive for 
public contracting out is the opportunity to profit from scale advantages, but still 
providing opportunity to getting to grips on the execution of municipal tasks, via 
shareholding of the public company or contracting out to a known public party (for 
example a local housing corporation). However, organizations for inter-municipal co-
operation are in many cases not a real alternative due to the conflicting interests of the 
participating municipalities. Some municipalities explain that they have more influence in 
case of outsourcing to a private company as it provides the opportunity to make more 
clear agreements with only one other external party. 
In some cases, municipalities use their sheltered employment organisation for 
internal tasks as cleaning services and park management. In addition, municipalities 
prefer to join a well-known party and therefore the availability of a public alternative is a 
motive. 
 Private contracting out is especially used for internal activities as cleaning 
services, canteen services and security. The decision to contract out privately is most 
based on a comparison of the costs, the quality and the stability of service provision under 
different regimes, especially in case of a market for this type of activity with more 
alternatives. However, in a large number of cases, we find that a fair comparison was not 
made, but that the conviction of a better private alternative led to contracting out.  
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In some cases, municipalities describe a combination of the modes of service 
provision. For example, for park management and the valuation of real estate, the 
municipality itself supplies a basic level of services, and in times of relative large 
amounts of work, private contractors supply extra capacity. 
 
5.4 Motives on contracting out, for specific municipal activities  
Based on section D of the interviews, we made a database of 170 activities, describing the 
mode of service provision on each of the ten standard activities, in each of the seventeen 
municipalities. For each situation, the interviews provided one or more motives for the 
actual state of service delivery. These data give – in addition to the qualitative description 
of the previous subsections - the opportunity to test a number of results of this study 
statistically. First, we investigate the differences in contracting out choices between types 
of municipalities (table 3). Secondly, we test the differences in contracting out choices for 
various types of activities (table 4). Finally, we test the relationship between the type of 
service provision and the motives as described in this study (table 5). 
 Table 3 shows for each of the subgroups of municipalities (according to size, 
political constellation and financial situation) the percentages of activities by the three 
types of service provision (self supply, public contracting out and private contracting 
out), as based on this section of the interviews. For all 17 municipalities, we calculated a 
percentage of the ten standard activities in each of the three categories of service 
provision. 
We tested the differences in these percentages with a Mann-Whitney U-test, for 
each of the pair of types of municipalities. As table 3 shows, the percentage of public 
contracting out is – on a 10% level - significantly higher for the municipalities with less 
than 40.000 inhabitants than for the larger municipalities. For smaller municipalities, it is 
attractive to share the execution of tasks, or to outsource these to another municipality. 
Right-wing municipalities have – as according to the literature might be expected - 
significantly higher percentages of contracting out to the private sector than left-wing 
municipalities. The other differences are not significant. 
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Table 3 Contracting out, different types of service provision, in % of all municipalities 
 Self supply Publicly contracted Privately contracted 
40.000- 32% 16%* 52% 
40.000+ 44% 7%* 50% 
    
right-wing 36% 10% 54%** 
left-wing 39% 14% 48%** 
    
high local taxes 40% 11% 49% 
low local taxes 34% 13% 54% 
    
General 37% 12% 51% 
*/** Differences are significant at p < 0.10 / 0.05 (Mann Whitney U-test). 
 
Table 4 presents – based on the same dataset of 170 activities – for different types of 
activities the actual mode of service provision. Based on transaction cost theory we 
distinguish the attributes asset specificity (whether specialized investments are required to 
deliver the service) and service measurability (how difficult it is for the contracting 
organization to measure the outcomes of the service or to monitor the activities required 
to deliver the service). For each of the ten standard activities, we scored both attributes 
based on an approach by Brown and Potoski (2003).8 Besides, we expect – based on 
institutional theory - differences in contracting out behaviour between activities having an 
internal focus (to the municipal organisation or employees) and activities with an external 
focus (to municipal citizens), as the last type may encounter more institutional pressure in 
case of underperformance. For all of the ten activities, we calculated percentages of the 
task execution in each of the three categories of service provision.  
 
                                                     
8 Brown and Potoski (2003a) asked 75 municipal managers about the level of asset specificity 
(whether specialized investments are required to deliver the service) and the service measurability 
(how difficult it is for the contracting organization to measure the outcomes of the service or to 
monitor the activities required to deliver the service) of 64 municipal activities. Although the 
scores are given in a different context, for the use of this study, we expect them to be appropriate 
like in Hefetz and Warner (2007) and Brown et al. (2008). Due to the fact that the 64 activities do 
not correspond fully with the ten activities in our study, we have chosen the activities 
corresponding the most. Hereafter we describe the ten standard activities, with between brackets 
the activity we use as a proxy: cleaning services (street / parking lot cleaning); canteen services 
(secretarial services); security (building security); payroll administration (payroll); IT-services 
(data processing); social services (public health programs); refuse collection (commercial solid 
waste collection); small infrastructure works (street repair); valuation of real estate (tax assessing); 
park management (parks and landscape maintenance / tree trimming / planting on rights of way). 
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Table 4 The mode of service provision, according to the characteristics of the activity 
 Self 
supply 
Publicly 
contracted 
Privately 
contracted 
low asset specificity (payroll-administration, canteen 
services, security, cleaning services, park management) 
31% 6%* 64% 
high asset specificity (refuse collection, social services, 
IT-services, infrastructure works, valuation of real 
estate) 
44% 18%* 
 
39% 
    
high service measurability (refuse collection, payroll-
administration, security, infrastructure works, cleaning 
services, park management) 
25%** 11% 65% 
low service measurability (social services, canteen 
services, IT-services, valuation of real estate) 
56%** 13% 31% 
    
internal activities (payroll-administration, canteen 
services, security, IT-services, cleaning services) 
39% 7% 54% 
external activities (refuse collection, social services, 
infrastructure works, valuation of real estate, park 
management) 
35% 16% 48% 
    
total 37% 12% 51% 
* / ** Differences are significant at p < 0.10 / 0.05 (Mann Whitney U-test). 
 
We tested the differences in these percentages with a Mann-Whitney U-test, for each of 
the pair of types of activities (low vs. high asset specificity, high vs. low service 
measurability and internal vs. external activities). Activities with higher asset specificity 
have a higher chance of being contracted out to a public provider than activities with 
lower asset specificity. For smaller municipalities, it might be attractive to share their 
assets with other municipalities in intermunicipal corporations. Also concomitantly with 
transaction costs literature, we see that activities with a low service measurability, have a 
higher chance of being executed in-house by the municipality itself. The differences in 
contracting out decisions between internal and external activities are statistically not 
significant. 
Multivariate analyses of motives for service provision 
Finally, we test in the following model whether the actual mode of service provision can 
be explained by the motives as described in this study. In addition to the more qualitative 
description of the motives in section 5.2, this analysis provides the opportunity to test the 
relative importance and the mutual relationships of the motives. For each of the ten 
standard-activities, we received in the interview on or more motives for the actual mode 
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of service provision. Based on these data, we test the following simple standard binary 
logit model: 
 
Yij = f(motiveijk; inhj; polj;taxj; municipalityj) 
 
Yij is a dummy variable describing the actual mode of service provision of activity i in 
municipality j. We tested two models. In model A, the dependent variable has value ‘1’ in 
case of contracting out to a public of a private external service provider. In model B, the 
dependent variable has value ‘1’ in case of private contracting out. In all other cases, the 
value is ‘0’. As the number of cases of contracting out to a public organisation is 
relatively small (n=20), it is not possible to test this variable independently.9 
 
For these analyses, we exploit the following variables: 
- Motiveijk: This variable had a value of ‘1’ in case this motive is used in case of 
activity ‘i’ in municipality ‘j’. In most situations, interviewees gave one principal 
motive for a specific situation (k=1), although in a number of cases more motives 
were reported (k = 1:2 or k = 1:3). Due to the number of potential motives and 
the number of interviews and activities, it is not possible to test the relevance of 
each motive separately. Therefore, we apply the groups of motives as described 
and categorized in table 1: ‘efficiency’, ‘quality of external service provision’, 
‘public private ideology’, ‘institutional motives’ and ‘pragmatic motives’.10 The 
two additional motives as mentioned spontaneously in this part of the interviews, 
‘influence on task execution’ and ‘management of the execution’, are added to 
the categories ‘institutional motives’ and ‘pragmatic motives’ respectively. This 
variable is a dummy, with a value ‘1’ in case this motive is used. We notice that 
for a number of situations, the interviewees used more motives and these are 
included all. 
- inhi : as in table 3, we include a ordinal variable representing the number of 
inhabitants, with ‘1’ for the municipalities with less than 20.000 inhabitants, 
‘2’for municipalities with 20.000 – 40.000 inhabitants, ‘3’ for municipalities with 
40.000 – 100.000 inhabitants, and ‘4’ for municipalities with more than 100.000 
inhabitants. 
                                                     
9 Besides, in such a model, it would not be relevant to test the choice for public contracting out vs. 
self supply or private contracting out. More relevant would be to test the decision for contracting 
out to a public organisation, given the fact that the activity was contracted out (to a public or 
private party). 
10 The motives ‘political patronage’ and ‘transaction costs’ are not given by the interviewees. 
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- poli as in table 3, we include a dummy variable representing the political 
constellation of the municipality, with ‘1’ for the left-wing municipalities, and ‘0’ 
for the right-wing municipalities.11  
- taxi; as in table 3, we include a dummy variable representing the local tax level, 
with ‘1’ for the municipalities with a relatively high tax rate, and ‘0’ for the 
municipalities with a relatively low tax rate. 
- municipalityj: We add seventeen dummy variables with value ‘1’ for each of the 
municipalities. 
 
Table 4 provides for both models the results. For matter of readability, we do not include 
the results of the municipality dummy variables.12 
 
                                                     
11 Although this variable might theoretically be related to the ideology motive, they are different as 
the last one is used both in favour and against contracting out. Some interviewees use this motive 
as a pro-market attitude in the organisation, also in more left-wing municipalities. 
12 Appendix C provides the results, with the results of the municipal dummy variables as well. 
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Table 4 Mode of service provision and motives 
 Model A: Public or private 
contracting out = 1, self 
supply = 0 
Model B: Private 
contracting out = 1, self 
supply or public 
contracting out = 0 
Motives  
Efficiency 2.183 (0.535) *** 1.539 (0.428) *** 
Quality of external service provision 1.017 (0.638) 0.781 (0.520) 
Public private ideology -1.548( 0.938) * -2.511 (0.936) *** 
Institutional motives1 0.583 (0.399) -0.149 (0.369) 
Pragmatic motives2 1.384 (0.449) *** 0.905 (0.349) *** 
Control variables3  
Number of inhabitants4 -0.593 (0.470) -0.294 (0.361) 
Political constellation, left-wing = 
‘1’ 
-3.427 (1.839) * -0.753 (1.473) 
Level of local tax rate, high taxes = 
‘1’ 
-1.297 (1.147) -0.098 (1.056) 
Constant 1.993 (2.077) -0.119 (1.663) 
-2 Log likelihood 163.391 190.870 
Cox & Snell R2 0.301 0.231 
Nagelkerke R2 0.410 0.308 
1.  The motives ‘local employment’, ‘core tasks’, and ‘influence on task execution’, 
‘independence of external service providers’, ‘stability’, ‘availability of alternatives’. 
2.  The motives ‘availability of expertise in the own organization’, ‘flexibility’, ‘available 
quantity of personnel’, and ‘management of the execution’. 
3. We included a dummy variable for each municipality in order to control for unique municipal 
conditions (not reported in this table). These control variables were only in a small number of 
cases significant. 
4. Ordinal variable: ‘1’, municipalities with less than 20.000 inhabitants; ‘2’, municipalities with 
20.000 – 40.000 inhabitants; ‘3’, municipalities with 40.000 – 100.000 inhabitants; ‘4’, 
municipalities with more than 100.000 inhabitants. 
* / ** / *** significant at p < 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01. 
 
The models show that the efficiency-motive is significantly positively related to 
contracting out decisions. Hence, municipalities expect external service providers – both 
private as public - to be more efficient. The quality-motive seems not to be relevant. The 
public private ideology-motive is negatively related to the decision to contract out, in 
particular to the private sector. Therefore, in case municipalities use this motive, this is, in 
general, used in favour of especially public or in house supply. The model does not give 
support to the relevance of institutional motives.  This may be due to the fact that these 
motives are heterogeneous as a number of these institutional arguments are used in favour 
of public supply – as ‘local employment’ and ‘influence on task execution’ - and other are 
used in favour of contracting out – as ‘independence’ and ‘stability of service provision’. 
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Besides, a number of motives – as ‘core tasks’ and ‘availability of alternatives’ are used 
in favour of contracting out by a number of interviewees, while other municipal managers 
use these motives against. However, an additional factor analysis showed that it was not 
possible to divide this category of institutional motives in a proper way. 13 Finally, the 
pragmatic motives have a significant positive relationship with contracting out, also to the 
private sector. This conclusion is in accordance with Bel and Fageda (2007) who find that 
pragmatic reasons are relevant for contracting out decisions. Only for the control variable 
‘political constellation’ we find a significant relationship. Left-wing municipalities are 
more in favour of self-supply than right-wing municipalities. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
For this study, we interviewed 17 municipal executives, responsible for the management 
of the municipal organisation to discuss the causes and motives for the choice of the 
current structure for the delivery of their services. This offered the opportunity to explore 
institutional aspects of contracting out and it shows that institutional theory might 
contribute to understand contracting out decisions of municipalities. Especially the 
stability of service provision, quality differences between internal and external service 
providers and choices between internal and external focused tasks need further 
investigation.  
 Despite the potential motives for contracting out, the mode of service provision 
is, in general, not a managerial or political issue. Municipalities do not regularly evaluate 
their organisational performance and the cost and quality of their service provision. In 
fact, if the activity shows an adequate performance without complaints about, for 
example, the quality, a cause for this consideration is in general lacking. However, in case 
of structural underperformance or complaints about the performance or the quality of the 
activities, the execution of tasks becomes a topic for evaluation and a change of service 
provider is considered or implemented. This shows the relevance of institutional 
pressures in contracting out decisions. Besides, institutional changes, as the introduction 
of new legislation, decentralisation of tasks, or the building of new accommodation may 
be an opportunity for considering contracting out. However, as far as we can observe, in 
most cases a merger of municipalities is not a relevant moment for changing the mode of 
service provision. 
As we conclude, the lack of a cause for considering contracting out is an 
important explanation for the in house provision of services. This may be an additional 
                                                     
13 Due to the number of institutional motives (6) and the number of interviews, it was not possible 
to include these motives separately in this statistical analysis. 
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explanation for the fact that the explanatory power of previous empirical studies is in 
general low (Bel and Fageda, 2007). 
 The interviews are used both to investigate the public choice theory and 
transaction costs hypotheses as to investigate the relevance of institutional concepts as 
well. The interviews show that the efficiency-motive is the most relevant aspect. Other 
studies explain the relevance of this motive by the empirical relationship between 
contracting out and use of municipal characteristics as size and the financial position of 
the municipality. These studies suppose that due to scale effects, smaller municipalities 
have more incentives to benefit from contracting out. However, the relevance of this 
motive does not seem to depend on the size of the municipality. For smaller 
municipalities, motives as, for example, the stability of their service provision, and the 
quality of external providers are far more relevant. Therefore, these motives might be 
better explanations for the suggested negative relationship between size and outsourcing 
in some empirical studies (compare Bel and Fageda, 2007). 
 The public private ideology-motive is relevant for decisions on contracting out. 
Left-wing municipalities say they are less prone for contracting out their service delivery, 
especially to private parties. In addition, in some municipalities we find that the private 
ideological opinion of strong local politicians or managers about the positive 
consequences of contracting out might be relevant as well. We do not find evidence for 
the political patronage motive as hypothesized by public choice theory (e.g. Dijkgraaf et 
al., 2003).  
 With respect to transaction cost theory, we find support for the service 
measurability hypothesis as activities with high service measurability have a higher 
chance of being contracted out, especially to the private sector. However, the 
interviewees do not consider the potential transaction costs of contracting – as for 
example the making of contracts and the monitoring of service execution – and asset 
specificity to be relevant. On the other hand, we find that activities with higher asset 
specificity have higher chance to be contracted out to a public service provider, as an 
intermunicipal corporation. 
 In case of contracting out, municipalities have different motives to choose for 
public or private execution of these tasks. In general, the efficiency-motive and the 
quality of service provision are leading. Some managers prefer contracting out to a 
private party for getting to grips, other explain that service provision by a public 
organisation provides more opportunity for management of the execution. 
 The interviews provided the opportunity to explore the relevance of other more 
institutional motives in contracting out decisions. Consistently with Wassenaar et al. 
(2010), according to the interviewees more institutional motives as the independence of 
external providers, the availability of alternatives, the stability of service provision, and 
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the legal status and retirement decisions of municipal employees - play a role in 
considering contracting out. Especially for smaller municipalities, the stability of service 
provision is relevant. Nevertheless, we do not find statistical significant results for these 
variables. Besides, we see the relevance of more pragmatic-organizational motives as the 
available quantity and quality of personnel in the own organization, especially for the 
smaller municipalities. 
 As we conclude, the efficiency-motive is relevant for decision-making, although 
municipalities need to have a catalyst to start evaluating the mode of service provision or 
decide for contracting out. As the coming years the financial position of most 
municipalities will deteriorate due to the consequences of the financial crisis, more 
municipalities might have an incentive to start a discussion on the actual mode of their 
service provision. Therefore, it would be relevant to investigate whether the lagging 
development of their budgets is a relevant institutional momentum and leads to an 
increase of contracting out of municipal activities.  
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Appendix A Interviewed municipalities and their characteristics 
 
  
Number of 
inhabitants 
Level 
of local 
taxes 
Political  
indicatore 
High local taxes / Left-wing    
100.000+ Groningen 182.484 680  1,0 
40.000-100.000 Leeuwarden 92.684 664  0,8 
20.000-40.000 IJsselstein  34.059 697  0,8 
20.000- Oostzaan 9.205 704  1,0 
   
Low local taxes / Left-wing  
100.000+ Amersfoort  141.211 600  0,5 
40.000-100.000 Heerenveen 43.027 625  0,8 
20.000-40.000 Hoogezand-Sappemeer  34.417 607  0,8 
20.000- Zijpe 11.512 605  0,5 
   
High local taxes / right-wing  
100.000+ Westlanda  99.299 673  0,0 
40.000-100.000 Lelystad 73.063 694  0,4 
20.000-40.000 Krimpen aan den IJssel 28.907 775 0,3 
20.000- Midden-Delflandc 17.451 789  0,0 
 Rijnwoude  18.704 669  0,3 
   
Low local taxes / right-wing  
100.000+ Zwolle  116.365 597  0,5 
40.000-100.000 Purmerend 78.434 502  0,3 
20.000-40.000 Nunspeet 26.567 522  0,0 
20.000- Breukelend 14.657 644 0,0 
a. The municipality of Westland was established in 2004. 
b. The municipality of Krimpen aan den Ijssel is discussing potential mergers with surrounding 
municipalities 
b. The municipality of Midden Delfland was established in 2004. 
d. The municipality of Breukelen will merge in 2011 with 2 other municipalities. 
e. We counted the relative number of aldermen with a membership of one of the left-wing parties 
(socialist party, green left and the labour party) in April 2009 (three years after the last municipal 
elections). In case this indicator comes at 50 percent, the relative number of left-wing members of 
the municipal council is decisive.
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Appendix B Interviewprotocol 
A. Question 1 
Which five motives are in general the most relevant in discussions about contracting out activities to a 
public or private organisation? Do these motives have a positive or a negative impact? Can you give 
the motives one of the following qualifications: ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘neutral’, ‘unimportant’, 
‘very unimportant’? Please provide an explanation to these answers.  
 
Motive Positive or negative Relevance of the 
motive1 
Explanation 
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
1. ‘Very important’, ‘important’, ‘neutral’, ‘unimportant’, ‘very unimportant’ 
B. Question 2 
In this question, we discuss some motives as provided by previous studies as being potentially relevant 
in considering contracting out. Please give an answer to the following questions: 
- Does this motive have a positive or negative impact on the discussion on contracting out? 
- Can you give the motives one of the following qualifications: ‘very important’, ‘important’, 
‘neutral’, ‘unimportant’, ‘very unimportant’.  
- Please provide an explanation to these answers.  
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Motive Positive 
or nega-
tive 
Importance  
of the 
motive1 
Explanation 
Efficiency; the lower costs of external service provision    
Quality; the higher quality of external service provision    
Independence of external providers; the independence of external providers from 
the municipal organisation 
   
Political patronage; the influence of local interested parties, as lobby groups, 
labour organisations or the local businesses 
   
Local employment; concern for employment in the municipality itself, especially 
for the organisations for sheltered employment 
   
Public private ideology; opinion of the role of the government in comparison with 
the market 
   
Availability of expertise in the own organisation; the availability of expertise and 
quality in the own organisation as needed for an adequate service level. 
   
Optimal scale of the municipal organisation; the optimal scale of the municipal 
organisation (in general, number of employees) or the adequate level of the 
municipality (number of inhabitants) for an acceptable service level. 
   
Core tasks; core tasks as defined by the municipality itself (tasks that should not 
be contracted out, due to the municipal responsibility). 
   
Flexibility; the flexible design of the municipal organisation, because of the lack 
of a constant level of work. 
   
Available quantity of personnel; the availability of enough personnel for an 
adequate service level. 
   
Risk avoidance; the desire to avoid risk in the provision of services.    
Stability; the stability of service provision    
Transaction costs; transaction costs that come with the process of contracting, as 
costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring. 
   
Costs of actives; the relatively high costs of investments that have to be made for 
the service provision. 
   
Experiences in other municipalities; positive or negative experiences of other 
municipalities with contracting out. 
   
Availability of alternatives; the availability of more then one external service 
provider. 
   
VAT-compensation fund; the opportunities as arisen with the introduction with 
the VAT-compensation fund in 2003. 
   
1. ‘Very important’, ‘important’, ‘neutral’, ‘unimportant’, ‘very unimportant’ 
 
C. Question 3 
Name three municipal activities that have recently been contracted out, or will be contracted out in the 
near future, or are discussed to be contracted out to a public or private organization? 
What are for these three activities the motives for contracting out or not? You can use the same 
motives as for questions 1 and 2, or additional motives. 
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Activity  Positive or negative Relevance of the 
motive1 
Explanation 
Activity 1 - 3  
- Motive 1     
- Motive 2     
- Motive 3     
1. ‘Very important’, ‘important’, ‘neutral’, ‘unimportant’, ‘very unimportant’ 
 
Which type of organization did you chose, or will you chose probably? 
For activity 1 - 3: 
Public / private 
Motive: 
D. Question 4 
Finally, we discuss the actual mode of service provision for ten standard activities. As far as for these 
activities a combination of mode is chosen, I will discuss the most relevant. The question is asked for 
the following activities:  
 
Activity Activity nr. I1 
Self supply O Publicly contracted out O Privately contracted out O 
   
 motive Explanation 
Motive 1 (most important)   
Motive 2 (second most 
important) 
  
Motive 3 (third most important)   
1. This question is asked for the following activities: (1) cleaning services, (2) canteen services, (3) security, (4) 
payroll administration, (5) IT-services, (6) social services, (7) refuse collection, (8) small infrastructure works, 
(9) valuation of real estate, and (10) park management. 
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Appendix C Statistical results 
This appendix provides the integral statistical analysis as described in section 5.3. 
 
Table B.1 Mode of service provision and motives 
 Model A: Public or private 
contracting out = 1, self 
supply = 0 
Model B: Private 
contracting out = 1, self 
supply or public 
contracting out = 0 
Efficiency 2.183 (0.535) *** 1.539 (0.428) *** 
Quality of external service provision 1.017 (0.638) 0.781 (0.520) 
Political-ideological motives1 -1.548( 0.938) * -2.511 (0.936) *** 
Institutional motives2 0.583 (0.399) -0.149 (0.369) 
Pragmatic motives3 1.384 (0.449) *** 0.905 (0.349) *** 
Number of inhabitants -0.593 (0.470) -0.294 (0.361) 
Political constellation, left-wing = 
‘1’ 
-3.427 (1.839) * -0.753 (1.473) 
Level of local tax rate, high taxes = 
‘1’ 
-1.297 (1.147) -0.098 (1.056) 
Amersfoort 4.043 (1.851) * 2.406 (1.487) 
Breukelen  -0.619 (1.932) 0.332 (1.482) 
Groningen 4.562 (2.461) * 2.123 (2.111) 
Heerenveen 1.685 (1.561) 0.797 (1.286) 
Hoogezand-Sappemeer 4.389 (1.615) *** 1.901 (1.264) 
IJsselstein 2.847 (1.846) 0.849 (1.641) 
Krimpen aan den IJssel 2.847 (1.846) 0.933 (0.921) 
Leeuwarden 2.941 (2.133) 0.531 (1.858) 
Lelystad 0.960 (1.073) 1.469 (0.995) 
Midden-Delfland -1.299 (1.371) -0.710 (1.017) 
Nunspeet -1.919 (1.444) 0.262 (1.246) 
Oostzaan -2.489 (1.654) -0.984 (1.530) 
Purmerend -1.463 (1.185) 0.098 (1.081) 
Rijnwoude 
Westland 
Zijpe 
Zwolle 
Due to redundancies, the model did not give results for 
these municipal dummy variables 
Constant 1.993 (2.077) -0.119 (1.663) 
-2 Log likelihood 163.391 190.870 
Cox & Snell R2 0.301 0.231 
Nagelkerke R2 0.410 0.308 
1.  The motives ‘political patronage’ and ‘public private ideology’. 
2.  The motives ‘local employment’, ‘core tasks’, and ‘influence on task execution’, ‘independence of external 
service providers’, ‘stability’, ‘availability of alternatives’. 
3.  The motives ‘availability of expertise in the own organization’, ‘flexibility’, ‘available quantity of 
personnel’, and ‘management of the execution’. 
* / ** / *** significant at p < 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01. 
